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IWorld War I came as the American political economy was experiencing
fundamental change. An industrial system of large corporations was replacing the
earlier economy of yeoman farmers and small manufacturers. The war was neither a
cause nor a consequence of the transformation. It did, however, intensify the
pervasive questions of legitimacy and rationality that the transformation had loosed.
During the war, the American state assumed unprecedented powers of economic
control. Simultaneously, capitalist associations proliferated and labor organizations
achieved unprecedented levels of strength. Though to some the wartime situation was
an aberration forced by exceptional international circumstance whose consequences
were to be reversed as soon as possible, to many others the wartime developments
suggested the direction in which the American political economy should be led. Despite
a consensus among this latter group that aspects of Lhe wartime system ought to be
retained in the postwar era, there was emphatic disagreement over which wartime
developments were commendable. Most capitalists envisioned an organized political
economy in which the state was generally passive and from which unions were totally
excluded. By contrast, progressive unionists and their allies looked to a political
economy in which both the state and organized labor would play an active role. It was
the capitalists' hegemonic vision that triumphed during the 1920s.
Though the unionist program was but a dissent and the capitalist project soon
succumbed to the Great Depression, from a vantage in the 1980s each of the systems of
economic regulation articulated in the 1920s deserves attention. First, subsequent
responses to the Depression did not appear out of thin air. They were conditioned by
the previous decade's debate and experience. As the Depression wore on and the NRA
gave way to the Wagner Act, the manner in which the American political economy was
regulated increasingly resembled the system envisioned by progressive unionists in
the 1920s. Second, the end of America's international hegemony and the attendant
collapse of the Keynesian social contract has prompted a debate that in many ways
2recapitulates the debate of the 1920s. The search during the 1980s for a new system of
economic regulation has again rendered problematic the role of the state and organized
labor. In order to understand the genesis of the New Deal and to gain perspective on
the emergence of its future successor, one should examine the programs of economic
regulation current in the 1920s.
Historical Background
Before explicating the contending systems, however, the historical background
from which they emerged must be described. The organization of capital, the
organization of labor, and the state's relationship to each, especially as altered during
World War 1, compose this background.
Industrialization had transformed the organization of American capital by the
beginning of the 20th century. Production had been organized by proprietors or
partners in small shops for local markets.1 Gradually, vs the potential market expanded
as a result of immigration and transportation advances, the scale of production
increased. As the scale of production increased, the forms of management and the
organization of production changed. Management and ownership were divorced as
increased capital requirements were met through limited liability and general
incorporation laws. Corporate hierarchies directed ever greater flows of material and
information. Seeking predictability throughout their domain, these private
bureaucracies integrated vertically and horizontally. As they stabilized their
environment through internalization of previously external markets, industrial
corporations simultaneously sought greater control over the production process itself.2
Mass production of standardized goods became concomitant with if not synonymous for
IAlfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American
Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
2David Brody, "The American Worker in the Progressive Age: A Comprehensive
Analysis," in David Brody, Workers in Industrial America (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980: 7-14.
3industrialization. Mass production not only reduced unit costs but, by reducing the
skill requirements of production, undermined the basis of craft control of the shop
floor. The capitalists' desire to wrest control of production from workers and vest it in
managers was expressed in both the "scientific management" and "open shop"
movements. 3 The premise of scientific management was that engineers could
determine and dictate to workers the single best production method. The open shop,
though nominally a system under which workers were employed without regard to
union membership, in fact signified a system in which avowed and suspected unionists
were excluded from employment. Thus, by World War I, the American economy was
populated by large industrial firms characterized by consolidated corporate structures
and standardized production processes.
The organization of labor, like that of capital, attended American
industrialization Early labor organizations were local affairs, reflecting the markets
in which they operated. National associations, such as the Knights of Labor, came and
went. Eventually, however, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) endured. The AFL
was distinctive in both its structure and philosophy.4 The AFL was a federation of craft
unions among which skilled workers were divided according to their trade.5 Thus,
machinists, molders and boilermakers, as well as carpenters, shoe makers, and printers
belonged to separate unions. The AFL's craft organization was complemented by a
voluntarist' philosophy, a philosophy that guided the Federation's conduct internally
3David Montgomery, "Whose Standards? Workers and the Reorganization of Production
in the United States, 1900-20," and "Machinists, the Civic Federation, and the Socialist
Party," in David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979): 113-127 and 57-63 respectively.
4 James 0. Morris, Conflict Within the AFL: A Study of Craft Versus Industrial Unionism.
1901-1938 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958): 5-9.
5Miners and others who worked around coal pits, members of the United Mine Workers
(UMW), were a notable exception in that they, like the Brewery, Wood, and Textile
workers, were organized in an industrial union regardless of trade. (Morris, Conflict
Within the AFL, pp. 15).
4and externally.6 Power within the AFL rested with the craft unions. Each union
established its own policy regarding membership, strikes and bargaining. The central
body, understood as an association of autonomous organizations composed of free
individuals joined in self-defense, had no power other than adjudication of
jurisdictional disputes among its affiliates. The outward expression of voluntarism was
apolitical anti-statism. Concluding that workers in a pluralist society would invariably
be divided by partisan politics, the AFL directed itself toward strictly economic goals. 7
Since a paternalist or hostile state hindered the organization of workers in autonomous
unions, the AFL opposed state intervention in the labor market. Thus, by World War I,
the 7.5% of American workers who were unionized were part of a labor movement that
was predominantly craft in structure and generally shunned the state.8
World War I was a critical conjuncture, a moment in which "social institutions
become more elastic, and longstanding patterns of policy are especia1ly subject to
change."9 The organization of the American political economy was intensified by the
industrial exigencies that accompanied the war. 10 The powers of the state expanded
6Michael Rogin, "Voluntarism: The Political Functions of an Anti-Political Doctrine," in
David Brody, ed.. The American Labor Movement (New York: Harper and Row, 1971):
100-118. For an account of voluntarism's relationship to republicanism and Americanjurisprudence, see Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations.
Law. and the Organized Labor Movement in America. 1880-1%0 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985): 32-59.
7 Nonetheless, unions did in fact participate in electoral politics, especially at the state
and local levels.
8 Unionization rate found at Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions,"
American Economic Review. Vol. 44, No. 3 (June 1954): 303.
9The definition is found at Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State
Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986): 70.
Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, underscored the war's significance when he
observed that it was a time in which "all social and economic forces are fluid and may
crystallize into the form they will take for decade to come." (Cited in H. M. Gitelman,
"Being of Two Minds: American Employers Confront the Labor Problem, 1915-1919," in
Labor History Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 1984): 204.)
10David Montgomery. The Fall of the House of Labor: the Workplace. the State. and
American Labor Activism. 1865-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987):
352-356,373-4; Murray Rothbard, "War Collectivism in World War I," in Ronald Radosh
5greatly. Commodities such as fuel, food and clothing were subject to federal regulation,
systems of communication and transportation came under direct federal
administration, and, through the War Industries Board, the state allocated raw materials
and controlled the utilization of the nation's industrial plant. The wartime expansion of
state power was accompanied, not coincidentally, by an increased organization of
capital and labor. The state, lacking a large permanent bureaucracy, used functional
representatives and their organizations as agents of wartime administration. Trade
associations, long stunted by antitrust regulation, grew swiftly when entrusted with
allocative responsibilities. Unions, in tight labor market conditions, expanded rapidly
under state aegis as de facto agencies of shop floor discipline. As a consequence of
World War I, therefore, the powers of the state and the organizations of capital and
labor were greater than ever.
What would come of the wartime developments? That question, rmised even
before the United States had entered the war, preoccupied capitalists, unionists, and
state actors. Prewar issues of legitimacy and efficiency, intensified by the
protagonists' aggrandized stature, reemerged at the war's end.1 I The demarcation of
public and private had been blurred by both corporatism and detailed economic
intervention by the state. Furthermore, wartime corporatism and state intervention
had renewed debate over the competing logics of competition on the one hand, and
cooperation and consolidation on the other. Finally, the simultaneous growth of unions
and the traditional bastions of the open shop, trade associations, had heightened the
standing conflict between the respective rights of employers and workers within the
and Murray Rothbard, ed., A New History of Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the
American Corporate State (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972): 66-110; and, Ellis Hawley, Ib.
Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and
Their Institutions. 1917-1933 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979): 20-6.
I lHawley, The Great War. pp. 1-11, 43-55.
6factory. These issues would be addressed, though not definitively resolved, as a system
of economic regulation was built during the postwar period.
Though each is by definition organized around a different internal logic, all
systems of economic regulation are concerned with the matter of equilibrating
production with consumption. In addition, most are oriented toward achieving such
equilibration at ever higher absolute levels. 12 Among those who sought a reconstituted
system of economic regulation in post-World War I America, it was generally
understood that any system would have to tackle four functional issues. 13 First,
debilitating competition in product markets would have to be tempered. Second,
workers would have to be integrated into the production process. Third, productivity
would have to be fostered. Fourth, business cycle fluctuations would have to be
attenuated. Since the problems were interrelated, solutions (as use of the term
'regulatorv system' suggests) came as packages. Though there was never a
comprehensive, authoritative statement of either, 14 two distinct systems were
12 As Roger Karapin has observed, regulatory systems are political as well as economic
constructs and as such are designed to assure civil peace. There is, however, a peculiar
yet pervasive presumption that economic growth will alleviate class conflict and
thereby contribute to civil peace. But, why should distributional struggles be fought
only over the additional increment of national product and not over the entire
product? Why should distributional fights be any less severe when total product is
growing than when it is stable or diminishing? Why should economic growth reduce
political conflict in general, even if it reduces distributional conflict? Isn't
distributional conflict in fact less divisive than conflict over values which cannot be
adjusted at the margins?
13See Robert Zieger, "Herbert Hoover, the Wage-Earner, and the 'New Economic
System', 1919-1929," in Business History Review Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer 1977): 162;
William J. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover. the Economists. and
American Economic Policy. 1921-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985):
1-8; and Steve Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal for the New Deal: Shop-Floor Insurgents,
Political Elites, and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers," in
Michael H. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., Working-Class America: Essays on
Labor. Community. and American Society (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983):
220-1.
14 Like all ideological constructs, the dichotomized typology employed here is
problematic. Each of the juxtaposed 'systems'--economic regulation by hegemonic
business and economic regulation through progressive unions--is a composite
assembled from a variety of (primarily secondary) sources. Though the analytic utility
7proposed, each of which proceeded from the political economic transformation that had
culminated in World War I. The tendered alternatives can be distinguished by the roles
each accorded the state and organized labor. Most capitalists favored a system in which
business was dominant, the state subservient and unions non-existent. Most unionists
favored a system in which unions and the state enjoyed powers equal to or greater than
those of business.
Economic Regulation by Hegemonic Business
The business hegemonic program emerged victorious in the 1920s. Product
markets were regulated by capitalists organized in either consolidated firms or trade
associations. Production was the exclusive domain of managers as unions were driven
from the field. As a result, or so proponents argued, productivity rose almost
continuously through the decade. Ultimately, of course, the system foundered on the
Great Depression. But at the time, having weathered the recession of 1921 and having
arguably mitigated the post-1929 downturn, partisans of business hegemony could
plausibly maintain that the system they championed was one which dampened cyclical
dysfunction. Organized labor, generally defensive and largely defeated, had no direct
influence on the system that emerged. The state's role was active, but nonassertive as it
either encouraged or acceded to capitalists' designs. "The business of America is
business," Calvin Coolidge declared.
The problem of product market stabilization had long been recognized. Wild
swings in user demand wreaked havoc among business planners. Unexpected demand
meant lost opportunity while undue optimism meant idle capacity. The more capitalized
and historical accuracy of each composite must be examined, the assay of the unionist
composite is especially debatable. Not only do victors tend to write history, but
historians tend to write about victory. Thus, much less has been written about labor
than business in the 1920s. Of that which has been written about labor, there is no
systematic examination of labor's economic vision. Regardless of whether this reflects
a particular lack of systematic thought on the part of labor or simply a gap in the
literature, the evidence on which the unionist composite is based is sparser than that
upon which the business composite is formed.
8the firm, the greater the risk. Given that an entire production process might be
paralyzed for want of a single input, the uncertain availability of a raw material or
intermediate good was similarly confounding. The response of many firms was to
integrate vertically. When successful, such internaliztion of theretofore market
coordinated exchange "permitted a more intensive use of personnel and facilities by
maintaining a high volume flow of goods through the processes of production and
distribution." 15 As Chandler observes, stabilization through vertical integration was
self-reinforcing:
Building the purchasing and marketing organizations that were essential to
mass-producing and distributing many goods, in turn, created powerful
barriers to entry by other firms into markets. New competitors had to set up
comparable buying and wholesaling networks before they could achieve the
volume necessary for competitive unit costs. As a result, industries where
administrative coordination lowered costs and provided essential services
quickly came to be dominated by a few large, integrated firms that competed
with one another in an oligopolistic manner, that is, in a market they dominated
but did not individually control. 16
Antitrust legislation notwithstanding, vertical integration and horizontal consolidation
into unitary firms was accepted by the courts.17 Thus, by World War I, highly
capitalized manufacturing firms, located in oligopolistic industries governed by a mass
production logic, achieved market stability through their corporate structures.
Firms in other sectors, however, found no such relief. "The modern
corporation," Chandler notes, "evolved more slowly and failed to flourish in industries
where the processes of production used labor-intensive methods that required little
15Alfred D. Chandler. Jr., "The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism," in
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative
Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980): 26.
16ih14.
17 Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative
Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981): 69-76; Chandler, Visible Hand pp. 333.
9heat, power, or complex machinery."18 Because they lacked such an internally
generated mechanism of extra-market control, much of the postwar effort to construct
a system of economic regulation was centered around competitive industries.
Many capitalists sought to stabilize their product markets through voluntary
cartels. The dilemma of pure competition is well known. Though each firm
individually and all firms collectively have an interest in maximizing profit,
uncoordinated rational behavior will lead, through price cutting and productive
expansion, to lower profits for all. Cartelization, wherein firms agree to maintain
prices and limit production, is the classic solution. Trade associationalism was its
American incarnation. Hawley reports that by 1917 there were hundreds of industrial
and trade associations "organized to achieve greater mastery over their environment
and enhance their power to predict, plan, and control economic behavior." 19 The
system of wartime administration spurred the formation of trade associations. 2 0 Prices
and production levels were regulated by the commodity sections of the War Industries
Board in conjunction with war service committees. The former were generally staffed
by businessmen on wartime service to the government and the latter were composed of
representatives appointed by trade associations. Wartime cartelization administered by
trade associations, though formally voluntary, was backed by strong moral suasion
(and the government's discretionary procurement powers). Many capitalists, however,
readily embraced fortified trade associations as the means by which cooperation would
replace competition. In the words of Harry Wheeler, president of the US Chamber of
18 Chandler, "Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism," pp. 29.
19 Hawley, The Great War pp. 7.
2 0Rothbard, "War Collectivism," pp. 72-8; Hawley, "Three Facets of Hooverian
Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1921-30," in McCraw, Regulation. pp.
98.
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Commerce, the wartime system laid "the basis for a truly national organization of
industry." 2 1
Incorporating trade associationalism into a peacetime system of economic
regulation was problematic. The courts were generally hostile, considering many trade
association activities to be conspiracies in restraint of trade and hence proscribed by
the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 2 Therefore, would-be cartelizers, such as the US Chamber
of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, sought revision of the
"antiquated" antitrust laws.2 3 Their efforts failed, however, as first A. Mitchell Palmer
and then Harry Daugherty, the Attorneys General under Wilson and Harding
respectively, attacked trade associations both publicly and in the courts.
But trade associations found a strong ally in Herbert Hoover, Harding's
Secretary of Commerce. 24 Hoover, a wartime food administrator and an engineer by
training, had a penchant for both efficiency and voluntarism.25 Although he rejected
statist bureaucracy as inefficient and illiberal, he assigned the state a central role in
economic regulation. The state, by encouraging the formation of trade associations and
their use as conduits of information, would foster efficiency through enlightenment.
Such enlightenment assumed several concrete forms. The Commerce Department, in
conjunction with trade associations, issued recommendations on the elimination of
waste in production. 26 Similarly, and again through the agency of trade associations, it
2 1Quoted in Rothbard, "War Collectivism," pp. 78.
221n the E. C. Knight case, the Supreme Court distinguished between consolidated
corporations, no matter how large, and associations of distinct firms, no matter how
small. See Chandler, Visible Hand. pp. 333.
23Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration:
Business. Government. and the Trade Association Issue. 1921-33 (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1976): 3-6.
24ibid., pp. 10+.
25Robert Zieger, Republicans and Labor. 1919-1929 (Lexington, Ky.: University of
Kentucky Press, 1%9): 60-4; Hawley, "Three Facets of Hooverian Associationalism," pp.
99.
26Barber, New Era to New Deal pp. 13.
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encouraged the standardization of sizes among manufacturers. But the most significant
and, from an antitrust standpoint, most controversial trade association activity
promoted by Hoover was the dissemination of cost and production data. Hoover
seemingly never intended that such information would be used for price fixing.27
Rather, the information was to enhance market efficiency by allowing more rational
planning. Indeed, it would facilitate competition "by giving the small unit the same
advantages which are already possessed by big business." 28 The advantages to which
Hoover referred were those that accompanied business planning, particularly the
ability to predict and stabilize demand.
Thus, the trade association was in competitive industry the functional
equivalent of consolidation in oligopolistic industry. Its coordinating power
approximated that of consolidation to a greater or lesser degree depending on whether
or not it was accompanied by price fixing. After D ulgherty's departure from the
Justice Department and Harlan Stone's ascendance to the Supreme Court, the legality of
exchanging cost and production data was upheld.29 In Keller's words, "Trade
associations flourished in this benign atmosphere." 30
Product market stabilization through trade associationalism was but one
component of the business hegemonic system of economic regulation. All capitalists,
regardless of whether they operated in competitive or oligopolistic markets, confronted
a common source of instability: labor. Herbert Hoover was ambivalent on the question
27
"Collusive price making," in Barber's words, "was antithetical to his concept of a
health economic order." Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 11. See also
Himmelberg, The Origins of the NRA pp. 45. For a contrary assessment, see Murray N.
Rothbard, "Herbert Hoover and the Myth of Laissez-Faire," in Radosh and Rothbard, A
New History of Leviathan: 111-45.
28Barber, New Era to New Deal. pp. 12
29Himmelberg, The Origins of the NRA pp. 47.
30Keler, "The Pluralist State," pp. 78.
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of labor.3 1 Much as the experience of the War Industries Board informed his approach
to product markets, the experience of the National War Labor Board informed his
approach to the labor market. Production within the factory, like production
throughout the economy, was to be founded on the principle of voluntary cooperation.
The basis of such cooperation within the factory was collective bargaining and
employee representation. Hoover, however, never specified what part unions were to
play in bargaining and representation. To him, unions were neither necessary nor
anathema. The attitude of employers, in contrast, was unambiguous. They would brook
no "outside interference".32 This meant reversing wartime developments. Unions,
which had grown dramatically, would have to be broken, and state agencies, which had
effectively abetted unionization 33 , would have to be dismantled. In short, capitalists
sought absolute managerial autonomy within the factory.
World War I had been very good for organized labor. As a result of increased
demand and a reduced labor force, the wartime labor market was very tight. In an
effort to maintain production in the face of wildcat strikes and high labor turnover,
the state promoted collective bargaining and employee representation as instruments
of stability. 34 The National War Labor Board (NWLB) protected the workers' right to
organize and insisted that employers bargain with workers collectively through shop
councils. Though the NWLB never compelled employers to recognize previously
3 1Zieger, "Herbert Hoover, the Wage-earner, and the 'New Economic System'."
32Haggai Hurvitz, "Ideology and Industrial Conflict: President Wilson's First Industrial
Conference of October, 1919," in Labor History Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 1977): 509-524;
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 392-3.
33The National War Labor Board and other agencies had been, in Montgomery's
description, "established at business's requests and then turned under pressure from
labor into Frankenstein monsters." (Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp.
392). On the origin of the NWLB and capitalists' subsequent attitude toward it, see
Gitelman, "Being of Two Minds."
34 Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker. pp. 119-123; Montgomery, Th&
Fall of the House of Labor pp. 373-4.
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unrecognized unions, de facto recognition ensued as union activists dominated the shop
councils. 35 As a consequence, union membership rose from 2.8 million in 1916 to 3.5
million in 1918, and by 1920 exceeded 5 million. 3 6 Worker militance accompanied union
growth and over 4 million workers struck during an unprecedented strike wave in the
heady days of 1919.37
It was in this tumultuous context that the postwar quest for managerial
hegemony within the factory began. An end to the state's direct involvement in labor
relations came quickly as the NWLB and other wartime agencies were abolished soon
after the war. 38 Thus, reassertion of managerial autonomy remained problematic only
in regard to the unions. The drive to reestablish managerial autonomy took the form of
a revived open shop campaign. Business leaders enunciated their position at President
Wilson's First Industrial Conference: the open shop was a "fundamental and vital"
principle on which they would not yield.39 Unions, argued capitalists, fostered
industrial strife and hindered productive efficiency. Domestic tranquility and
economic prosperity were said to depend upon managerial autonomy.4 0
35Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 414-5, 445.
36U. S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics. 1950 ed., Bulletin #1016, table
E-1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951): 139.
37 Jean Trepp McKelvey, AFL Attitudes toward Production. 1900-1932 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1974 [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19521): 46.
3 8Hawley, The Great War. pp. 45; Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 393.
The politics surrounding the postwar withdrawal of the state from detailed economic
regulation should be examined further. The state's (enforced?) retreat seems to
undermine the "corporate-liberal" interpretation of the New Deal which portrays
collective bargaining as institutionalized in the Wagner Act as a class-conscious
capitalist rationalization of capitalism. If capitalists possessed the requisite
omniscience to rationalize capitalism and did so in a way that built upon the National
War Labor Board, why wasn't the board retained at the war's end? Why would
capitalists be omniscient in 1935 but not in 1919?
39Hurvitz, "Ideology and Industrial Conflict," pp. 519-23.
4 0The open shop was anointed the "American Plan", and the campaign for it became
enmeshed in the broader postwar Red Scare. Managerial autonomy was equated with
traditional rights of property while unionism was depicted as an assault by foreign
radicals on American individualism.
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The postwar open shop campaign employed techniques, both traditional and
innovative, that built upon wartime developments. Trade associations were the
traditional vehicle of open shop campaigns. 4 1 In addition to propogandistic efforts,
they engaged in industrial espionage and strike breaking. As noted above, the system
of administration established by the War Industries Board spurred the growth of trade
associations. 4 2 Thus, the veterans of previous open shop campaigns, such as the
National Metal Trades Association, the National Founders' Association, the National
Erectors Association and the National Association of Manufacturers, had been
substantially reinforced. A network of local organizations further augmented the open
shop ranks. In keeping with prewar practice, state action frequently supplemented
private antiunion efforts.4 3 While local police, state militia and federal troops
suppressed strikes,44 the Courts issued sweeping labor injunctions, enforced yellow-
dog contracts, and construed otherwise narrowly interpreted antitrust laws as broad
prohibitions of union activity. 45
The postwar open shop campaign, however, was not simply a replay of earlier
efforts. A new device, company unionism, expanded the traditional repertoire of
antiunion tactics.4 6 Though they might have wished otherwise, many employers were
4 1Gitelman, "Being of Two Minds," pp. 194; Bernstein, The Lean Years. pp. 148-56.
4 2Though the literature does not distinguish between an increase in the number of
distinct associations and an increase in the membership of pre-existing associations,
both presumably occurred.
4 3Some instruments of state action were wartime developments. The 1917 Lever Act,
which empowered the president to control the production and allocation of food and
fuel, was used against both miners and railroad workers in 1919. Deportation of
radicals, censorship of publications and restrictions on assembly persisted into the
1920s. (Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 387-402).
4 4Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 397; David Brody, Steelworkers in
America: The Nonunion Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1%9 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1%01): 250; Zieger, Republicans and Labor pp. 127.
4 5Bernstein, The Lean Years. pp. 190-215. On the backlash against injunctions, see
Zieger, Republicans and Labor. pp. 141, 259.
4 6Though a number of nonunion employee representation plans predated the war, it
was not until the war and its aftermath that they proliferated. For mention of prewar
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compelled by historical circumstance to acknowledge workers' obvious if not intrinsic
tendency to solidaristic behavior. The question was one of controlling that tendency.
Company unionism was animated by the belief that plant-specific or firm-specific
solidarity was preferable to craft, class or industrial solidarity. Labor organizations
confined to a particular plant or firm would be weaker and therefore more amenable to
management domination. Many company unions were created from scratch, but many
others were wartime shop committees, reincarnated on a nonunion basis.47
Though invariably intended as instruments of managerial autonomy within the
factory, the relation of company unions to the hegemonic capitalist system of economic
regulation evolved over the course of the decade. In the immediate postwar period
company unionism was little more than a defense against impending unionization.
"This is quite evident," Bernstein notes, "from the statistics of the National Industrial
Conference Board: the Board found 490 firms that established p!asn during the
turbulent years 1919-24 and only 73 that did so in the calm period 1924-28."48 In the
later period, however, employee representation through company unions became part
of a broader strategy of 'welfare capitalism'.49 Welfare capitalism sought worker
quiescence as a goal in its own right and as a means to greater productivity. Worker
loyalty, perceived as the basis of the desired quiescence, was to be secured through
schemes see: Henry Gudza, "Industrial Democracy: Made in the U.S.A.," in Monthly
Labor Review Vol. 107, No. 5 (May 1984): 28; and, McKelvey, AFL Attitudes pp. 57. For a
discussion of the most significant of prewar plans, the Colorado Industrial Plan, see
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 348-50; and Bernstein, The Lean Years
pp. 157-169.
47 Montgomery, pp. 414, 456. McKelvey suggests that wartime shop committees
established on a voluntary basis were more enduring than those created under state
coercion. (McKelvey, AFL Attitudes pp. 57).
48 Bernstein, The Lean Years, pp. 157.
49 David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," in Brody. Workers in
Industrial America. pp. 48-81; Bernstein, The Lean Year pp. 157-188. Montgomery
asserts that, like narrow employee representation. "there was little advance in
corporate welfare practice anywhere in American industry after 1921." (Montgomery,
The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 455).
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material benefits and employee representation. Thus, high wages, stock options,
insurance plans and health services augmented company unions in the capitalist effort
to integrate labor.50
Though firms of all sizes had established company unions shortly after the war,
by the middle of the decade company unions and welfare policies more generally
became the province of large firms.5 1 The trend is explicable. Representation and
welfare plans were generally administered by 'personnel managers' in industrial
relations departments. But, only large firms had sufficiently developed corporate
bureaucracies to support industrial relations departments. Furthermore, only large
firms operating in oligopolistic industries were able to afford high wages and other
welfare programs. The strategy of integrating labor through welfare capitalism
appears, therefore, to have been limited to the same firms that were able to stabilize
product mrkets through unitary corporate structures.
In contrast, firms in competitive industries seem to have pursued an
intransigent strategy toward labor. This pattern might result from a combination of
economic logic and historical circumstance. Firms in competitive industries are, by
definition, sensitive to cost differentials. To the extent that labor costs are particularly
significant because competitive industries tend to be labor intensive, each individual
firm has a great incentive to suppress wages. Labor costs could be equalized across an
industry by means of a national agreement. Most competitive industries in the prewar
era, however, had chosen a strategy of minimizing wages through implacable
antiunionism. 5 2 Trade associations were a primary instrument of that antiunionism.
But, in the postwar period, trade associations assumed broader functions as institutions
5 00f course, the promise of welfare capitalism far exceeded the reality. Company
unions were generally supine and high wages were generally a misnomer.
5 1Bernstein, The Lean Years pp. 171-81; and, Brody, "Welfare Capitalism," pp. 59.
5 2Montgomery, "Machinists," pp. 49-59.
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through which firms in competitive industries sought product market stabilization.
Thus, as a result of institutional history rather than intrinsic logic, the manner in
which competitive industries sought to stabilize product markets reinforced the
approach they took to labor relations.
Product market stabilization and integration of labor through welfare
capitalism simultaneously benefitted from and promoted diminution of business cycle
fluctuation, the third component of the capitalist hegemonic system of economic
regulation. The 1921 recession, in which the wholesale commodity price index fell 33%
and the gross national product declined over 6%, underscored the importance of
dampening the business cycle.5 3 Herbert Hoover was at the center of what might be
anachronistically referred to as 'macroeconomic' stabilization efforts.54 In the
introduction to a 1923 volume entitled The Stabilization of Business. Hoover wrote:
We are constantly reminded by some of the economists and businessmen that
the fluctuation of the business cycle is inevitable; that there is an ebb and flow
in the demand for commodities and services that cannot from the nature of
things be regulated. I have great doubts whether there is a real foundation for
this view. 5 5
Typically his scheme relied on private efforts coordinated by and augmented through
state action. Trade associationalism, high wages and countercyclical spending
constituted a stabilization triad.5 6
Trade associationalism was to moderate cyclical swings by facilitating business
planning. Trade associations were to collect price and production data which the
government, through Hoover's Department of Commerce, would publish. The regular
collection and exchange of such data would, according to Hoover, "contribute greatly to
53George Soule, Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression. 1917-1929 (New York:
Rinehart and Company, 1947): 96.
54Barber, From New Era to New Deal Zieger, Labor and Republicans pp. 91-7.
55Cited in Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 15.
5 61n addition to the three components mentioned here, Barber identifies monetary and
trade aspects of Hoover's thinking. See Barber, From New Era to New Deal.
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stabilize commerce and industry as it works strongly to prevent over-expansion and
over-speculation, over-stocking of foreign goods, etc."5 7 The dissemination of
information would not only temper optimism in boom, but mitigate pessimism in bust.
It would provide "courage in times of depression" by documenting the considerable
level of on-going business activity.5 8 Reflecting the period's pre-Keynesian thinking,
no distinction was made between macro and micro economics. The data gathered by
trade associations would serve "to aid the individual business firms in basing their
policies upon fact, and to stabilize business in general through proper coordination of
production, prices, stocks, etc."59
Though the concept of aggregate demand had yet to be invented, the importance
of consumer purchasing power to general prosperity was recognized. 6 0 High wages,
paid by enlightened employers, were seen as the key to consumer purchasing power.
In times of expansion, high wages would buttress steady growth by maintaining
consumer demand under conditions of rising productivity. Conversely, in times of
recession, maintenance of consumer demand would arrest business contraction. The
doctrine of high wages, however, was not universally accepted. In the midst of the
1921 recession the National Association of Manufacturers reaffirmed its faith in "the
operation of economic law" which precluded the maintenance of wages at an
"artificial" level.6 1 Orthodox economist Alvin Hansen predicted a "contest of high wage
versus full employment".62 Nonetheless, the doctrine of high wages "became a
5 7Quoted in Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 8.
58ibid.
59 ibid., pp. 9.
6 0Soule, Prosperity Decade. pp. 218-220; Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 27-30.
6 1Bernstein, The Lean Years. pp. 179. It is unclear from Bernstein's account whether
NAM changed its position over the decade. He cites an unidentified 'thoughtful
employer' to substantiate his claim that "the leaders of industry had drastically
overhauled their philosophy of wages" by 1926. However, Bernstein may have
confounded the views of competitive and oligopolistic capitalists.
6 2Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 47.
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prominent article in the creed of many business spokesmen." 63 In practice, however,
the policy was rather pallid. Though real wages were 28% higher in 1928 than in 1918,
the rate of increase over the five years preceding 1923 was one third greater than that
over the subsequent five years. Moreover, much of the increase is attributable to the
fact that prices fell more precipitously than wages during the 1921 recession. "Verbal
acceptance of the economy of high wages," in Soule's words, "was thus in large measure
a rationalization after the fact."64 Still, the doctrine of high wages cannot be dismissed
as merely empty rhetoric. When push came to shove in 1929, oligopolistic industries
steadfastly maintained wage (and price) levels. 65 Indeed, according to the AFL
Executive Council, whereas 92% of firms reporting to the Bureau of Labor Statistics cut
wages during the 1921 recession, only 7% of firms did so in 1930.66
Hoover recognized that trade associations and high wages alone were
indequate to stabilize the business cycle. Countercyclical spending, expenditure
inversely related to the level of autonomous business activity, was also necessary. 67
The now familiar but then novel theory of a 'multiplier' underlay the concept of
countercyclical spending.68 It was understood that in addition to any direct impact on
economic activity, public works expenditure and business investment would percolate
6 3Soule, Prosperity Decade. pp. 220. But, unlike the 1921 recession, real wages declined
as prices proved stickier than wages. (Bernstein, The Lean Years pp. 239-60).
64 ibid., pp. 220-1. The significance of the doctrine is diminished further when one
notes that manufacturing productivity, measured as output per labor-hour, rose 43%
between 1919 and 1929, a rate one and a half times that of real wages over the period
1918-1928. (Soule, Prosperity Decade. pp. 121). For a detailed critique of interpretations
that present the 1920s as a period of prosperity and high wages see Frank Stricker,
"Affluence for Whom?--Another Look at Prosperity and the Working Classes in the
1920s," reprinted in Daniel J. Leab, ed., The Labor History Reader (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1985): 288-316.
65Brody, "Welfare Capitalism," pp. 67.
66Barber, From New Era to New Deal pp. 85.
67ibid., pp. 15-22.
68ibid., pp. 16-8; See also Barber, A History of Economic Thought (New York: Penguin,
1%7): 243-4.
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through the economy as resulting income was spent in an iterative process. The role of
the state, at least in comparison with later practice, was moderate. The federal
government was to serve a catalytic but otherwise nonparticipatory role. Lacking
substantial fiscal authority of its own, it would signal state and local subgovernments as
well as private industry when countercyclical spending was warranted. The projects to
be undertaken were those that would be undertaken in any case, simply timed to
coincide with recession. 69 Befitting pre-Keynesian orthodoxy, deficit financing was
generally rejected. Expenditures were to come from reserves built during years of
plenty. The 1921 Conference on Unemployment, orchestrated by Hoover, concluded:
If all branches of our public works and the construction work of our public
utilities--the railways, the telephones, etc.--could systematically put aside
financial reserves to be provided in times of prosperity for the deliberate
purpose of improvement and expansion in times of depression, we would not
only greatly decrease the depth of depressions but we would at the same time
diminish the height of booms. We would in fact abolish acute unemployment
and wasteful extravagnce. For a rough calculation indicates that if we
maintain a reserve of about 10 percent of our annual construction for this
purpose, we could almost iron out the fluctuations in employment.7 0
It is hardly giving away the story to suggest that this view was unduly optimistic.
Sufficient or not, however, Hoover and others thought that the stabilization trinity of
trade associationalism, high wages and countercyclical spending had mastered the
business cycle.
The ostensible prosperity of the 1920s did little to shake that faith. In 1929 real
GNP was 39% greater and real per capita GNP was 20% greater than in 1919.71 Much of
that growth can be attributed to increases in productive efficiency.7 2 Improving
efficiency through product market stabilization, labor integration, and business cycle
69 Countercyclical projects were to pay the "usual rates and wages". This would of
course counteract deflationary tendencies. See Barber, From New Era to New Deal, pp.
16; and, Rothbard, "Herbert Hoover," pp. 114.
7 0Quoted in Barber, From New Era to New Deal pp. 19.
7 1Stricker, "Affluence for Whom?," pp. 290.
7 2Soule, Prosperity Decade. pp. 121-2.
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stabilization was the stated goal of proponents of the business hegemonic system of
economic regulation. 7 3 Trade associationalism would foster productive efficiency
through the promotion of product standardization and the dissemination of technical
information. Reassertion of managerial hegemony within the factory would enhance
productivity in several ways. Extirpation of unions would put an end to restrictive
work rules and allow continued taylorization of the work process. Welfare capitalism,
by increasing workers' loyalty to the firm, would reduce turnover rates and increase
workers' attentiveness. 74 High wages would increase the relative and absolute price of
labor, thereby inducing mechanization and improved managerial techniques.75
Diminution of business cycle fluctuation would minimize both the number of marginal
firms that entered the market during boom and the extent of idle capacity that afflicted
the economy during bust.7 6 The extent to which the business hegemonic system of
economic regulation actually advanced productive efficiency in the 1920s is debatable.
The greatest gains in productivity occurred immediately after the war, before the
system was fully articulated or implemented.77 The problematic correspondence
between promise and reality notwithstanding, America's post-World War I political
7 30n the postwar search for efficiency see: Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 7-8;
Zieger, Republicans and Labor pp. 62; Hawley, "Hooverian Associationalism," pp. 97;
and, Hawley, The Great War pp. 81-5.
7 4Brody, "Welfare Capitalism," pp. 32-3.
7 5Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 27-9; Soule, Prosperity Decade. pp. 127.
7 6Zieger, Republicans and Labor pp. 228; Barber, From New Era to New Deal. pp. 7-8.
77 Output per manhour increased 28% between 1919 and 1924 but only 21% in the 5
years thereafter (Soule, Prosperity Decade. pp. 121). Furthermore, the extent to which
the business hegemonic system of economic regulation was actually implemented, and
thus potentially responsible for the later advance, is also debatable. The lack of
coercive enforcement of trade associational cooperation, the meagre reality of high
wages, the impotence of worker representation plans, and the absence of legislative
authority for countercyclical spending suggest that the system was not adopted in its
entirety. On the incomplete implementation of the system's various components see
Himmelberg, Origins of the NRA. pp. 75-7; Brody, "Welfare Capitalism," pp. 39-60; and,
Barber, New Era to New Deal. pp. 21-2, 118-20.
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economy approximated the business hegemonic system and the economy's growth (and
subsequent collapse) were attributed to business hegemony.
Ecomenic Regulation through Progressive Unions
Thus unionists confronted a comprehensive and seemingly successful system of
economic regulation from which they were entirely excluded. Union membership,
which had peaked at 5 million in 1920, fell continuously through the decade to
approximately the prewar level. Unions were nonexistent in the core manufacturing
industries--autos, steel, and electrical equipment--and were on the defensive in those
industries--textiles, coal, and machining--in which they had had a foothold. By 1930
the unionization rate of the nonagricultural workforce was scarcely half of what it had
been in 1920.78 Perhaps worse than their weakened condition per se was the fact that
the then dominant political economic thought accorded unions no role whatsoever.
The prospects for recovery were seemingly bleak, and the popular press dyslegIzcd the
moribund labor movement.
Faced with this dire situation, progressive unionists articulated an alternative
system of economic regulation, one in which unions and the state would play a
significant role.79 In order to create the space for this alternative, progressive
unionists had first to explain the awesome weakness of organized labor. They rejected
easy. exogenous explanations. Though they acknowledged both the severity of judicial
antiunionism and the success of company unionism, each was dismissed as the primary
cause of union weakness. In a 1928 volume Leo Wolman, Director of Research for the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers and an instructor at the New School, wrote:
78 Bernstein, Lean Years. pp. 84-5.
79 The term 'progressive unionists' is used to distinguish people such as Sidney Hillman,
head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and William Johnson, head of the
International Association of Machinists, from conservative AFL leaders such as Samuel
Gompers and William Green. (See Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 399-
410; and, Morris, Conflict within the AFL. pp. 86-110). See the caveat at footnote 14
which warns of the problematic nature of the progressive unionist construct.
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It is, for example, true that organized labor here encounters severe legal
disabilities. But the record indicates that an imaginative and forceful policy
more often overcomes these legal obstacles than not. Similar mystic potency
attaches to such a development as the company-union movement, which is not
nearly the barrier to bona fide organization that it is credited with being. The
company unions survive and presumably prosper because they have not yet, in
modern times, met direct and continuous attack. In this respect the non-union
industry, safeguarded by a company union, appears to be in no different
position from a non-union industry that deals directly with its unorganized
labor. And in this country the last group is by far the more numerous of the
two.80
Progressive unionists attributed the seemingly imminent demise of organized labor to
unions themselves. The failure was twofold nonfeasance. The labor movement had
failed to organize the unorganized, and it had failed to respond to structural economic
change.8 1 The two were closely related. Narrow conceptions of vested interest among
craft unions weakened the AFL's organizing will, and outdated craft organization
limited the AFL's organizing ability. Even if aggressive organizing campaigns were
undertaken, craft unions addressed neither the concerns of industrial workers nor the
needs of an industrial economy. The labor movement had become, according to
progressive unionists, a mere vestige.
The solution to union atrophy lay in the refunctionalization of unions.
Progressive unionists argued that so long as the ideology and structure of organized
labor remained ill-suited to the prevailing economic environment, unions could not
expect to survive. Only by redefining its relation to the national political economy
could organized labor successfully challenge the business hegemonic system of
economic regulation. Toward this end progressive unionists enunciated a system of
economic regulation in which unions and the state figured prominently. The unionist
alternative, like the business hegemonic system, built upon wartime developments.
Moreover, it addressed the same functional issues as the business hegemonic system.
8 0Leo Wolman, "Economic Conditions and Union Policy," in J. B. S. Hardman, ed.,
American Labor Dynamics in the Light of Post-War Develooments (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928): 41.
8 1ibid., pp. 37-40. See also Morris, Conflict within the AFL pp. 109-110.
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However, in the unionist alternative: unions would assume the task of product market
stabilization in competitive industries; unions would become the agents of increasing
productivity on the shop floor; unions, protected by state agencies, would integrate
workers through industrial organizations; and, the state, backed by industrial unions,
would aggressively manage 'macroeconomic' stability. Thus the vision propounded by
progressive unionists was diametrically opposed to the ascendant business hegemonic
system of economic regulation.
Progressive unionists undoubtedly desired restoration of organized labor's lost
status; but, the system of economic regulation they articulated was more than an
ideological instrument of self-interest. The unionist dissent contained a critique of
business hegemonic regulation that was couched largely in business hegemony's own
terms. Unionists argued that business hegemonic regulation was unable to fulfill its
purported goals of efficiency and stability.82 If workers were not protected from the
consequences of technical improvement by independent unions, they would not
participate in shop floor efficiency drives regardless of company representation and
welfare programs. Similarly, unionists argued, in the absence of autonomous unions
there would be downward wage pressure, especially in competitive industries. This
would aggravate destructive competition and undermine 'macroeconomic' stabilization.
Furthermore, if private cartels were given free rein, output would be curtailed and the
mass production economy would be fettered. Therefore, unionists argued, strong
unions and an active state were necessary in order to achieve stable growth.
Unions and the state were linked in the postwar period by progressive unionists
who sought the nationalization of coal mines and railroads. 8 3 Nationalization was, in
large measure, merely a means of perpetuating the wartime gains organized labor had
8 20n this point progressive unionists and mainline AFL leaders agreed.8 3Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 392-401; Zieger, Republicans and Labor,
pp. 24-5.
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made in each industry under government regulation. Though efforts were made to
forge a coalition of workers, consumers and administrators in support of
nationalization, nationalization plans were never embedded within a broader
conception of economic regulation. By the early 1920s it was clear that nationalization
demands were moot, and progressive unionists focused on other aspects of their
program.
Product market stabilization in competitive industries was important to labor
because cutthroat competition among firms often took the form of wage reductions.
Cost differentials are critical in competitive industries. The more homogeneous the
product, the greater the pressure to minimize costs; the more labor intensive the
production process, the greater the incentive to cut wages. Whereas the business
hegemonic system of economic regulation sought to temper competition through trade
associations, the unionist regulatory scheme sought stability through the
establishment of uniform wage rates. The standardization of wage rates across an
industry would serve as a "bulwark against the unscrupulous competition of certain
employers at the expense of their workers."84 The unionist approach to product market
stabilization divested trade associations of their privileged role and excluded company
unions entirely. Wage rate standardization was to be achieved through industry-wide
collective bargaining, something considered impossible under a regime of firm-
specific company unions.8 5 Even if capitalists organized in a trade association could
8 4Paul Wander, "The Challenge of Company-Made Unions," in Hardman, American
Labor. pp. 235.
8 5A strong trade union, wrote Paul Wander, "becomes an ally of the 'fair' employer.
Having renounced for himself that anarchic competition which thrives at the expense
of labor conditions, he henceforth stands to gain from the standardization and
stabilization of those conditions through collective bargaining that is the union's
program. It is a question of far-reaching import for the theory of company unionism,
whether any employer who is not a dominant factor in his industry can permanently
dispense with such trade-union support without being swayed in his own wage and
labor policy by that same anarchic competition. Experience seems to supply a
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unilaterally standardize wage rates across an industry, the agreement would likely
founder on the same competitive pressure that spurred action initially. That
competitive pressure afflicted not only management. Given its firm-specific basis, a
company union, though potentially engaged in a distributional struggle with
management, would rationally ally with management against other firms. Thus,
company unions provided no check against destabilizing wage reductions. Only an
independent union organized throughout an industry had both the power and
incentive to enforce wage rate standardization across firms.
There was historical precedent for unions to act as stabilizing agents in
competitive markets. In 1900 the International Association of Machinists and the
National Metal Trades Association entered a ballyhooed but short-lived agreement
designed to stabilize the machining industry.8 6 Unionist efforts to stabilize the
bituminous roal industry proved more enduring.8 7 Coal markets, in which many
operators produced a homogeneous product, were paradigmatically competitive. Wages
constituted the bulk of production costs and were under constant competitive pressure.
Miners, therefore, sought to establish a uniform wage rate across firms organized in
regional markets. The largest bituminous region, the Central Competitive Field (CCF),
extended from Pennsylvania to Illinois. As settlement of the massive 1897 strike in the
CCF, the United Mine Workers and the CCF operators concluded a far-reaching
agreement.
[Aln elaborate scale of payments, designed more to equalize employers' labor
costs than to equalize wages per se, was coupled with a general wage advance, a
formal eight-hour day, and a checkoff of union dues. It was evident that the
operators signing the agreement had a vested interest in a large union strike
fund, because strikes were the only means to bring recalcitrant employers into
generally negative answer to the question." (Wander, "Company-Made Unions," pp.
235).
86 Montgomery, "Machinists," pp. 49-57.
87The following discussion relies on Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp.
341-3, 387-8, 3%-8, and 408-9.
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the agreement. Mine operators in bituminous had been unable to organize
themselves to stabilize prices, because powerful buyers of coal, such as the
railroads and the steel industry, owned mines of their own, which helped them
hold down prices. The UMWA thus provided a rationalizing agency for the
industry.8 8
The union's ability to police the market was dependent upon extensive unionization.
and the CCF agreement ultimately foundered on competition from nonunion operators
outside the CCF.
Like organized labor generally, the UMW had been strengthened by World War
I. The Fuel Administration, desirous of steady wartime production. sanctioned a CCF
agreement in October 1917 that granted a pay increase, protected workers against
dismissal for union membership, and levied a daily fine against strikers. Settlements
modelled on the so-called Washington Agreement were reached in each of the nation's
regional coal markets. As a result of the nondiscrimination clause, the UMW was able to
expand its base into antiunion strongholds such as West Virginia and Alabama. The
armistice, however, meant an end to the government-backed agreements. Nonetheless,
when the UMW struck in November 1919 for shorter hours and better pay, the
President invoked the wartime Lever Act in order to enforce Washington Agreement.
Within the CCF, the operators and the union accepted the government's settlement,
thereby renewing the prewar stabilization strategy. However, in the previously
nonunionized fields that lay outside the CCF, fields that had grown in importance as a
result of wartime demand, the operators ignored the mandated settlement.89 In the face
88 ibid., pp. 342.
89The behavior of the CCF operators is curious. Why didn't they actively seek the
imposition of the settlement on their competitors? The state's selective use of coercion,
directed almost entirely against the union, is also curious. Why did Wilson reactivate
lapsed wartime authority? Having done so, why didn't he impose the settlement on
recalcitrant operators nationwide? Similarly one might inquire why the Harding
Administration, having censured the railroad companies, didn't enforce the Railroad
Labor Board's decisions against the companies. One might also ask why the Coolidge
Administration refused to enforce the 1924 Jacksonville Agreement which it had
brokered between the CCF operators and the UMW. (See Zieger, Republicans and Labor
pp. 119, 233). The instrumentalist state-as-executive-committee-of-the-bourgeoisie
approach does not explain the state's behavior. First, the state had already taken pro-
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of state coercion and cyclical downturn, unionist efforts to impose the settlement
outside the CCF failed. Subsequent attempts fared no better. As a consequence, the
unionist stabilization strategy collapsed. According to Montgomery, "By 1925, only 40
percent of the country's bituminous coal was mined under union contract, as compared
with 72 percent in 1919, and the unionized sector remained under intense pressure to
reduce labor costs."9 0 The unionist stabilization strategy failed for lack of unionization,
not conceptual weakness.
In the unionist system of economic regulation, the stabilization of product
markets through wage standardization was closely linked to the promotion of
productivity through union-management cooperation. The linkage was both passive
and active. In the passive vein, uniformly high wages were to spur mechanization and
improved managerial technique. UMV President John Lewis, bemoaning the
retardation of mechanization that resulted from competitively depressed wages,
observed that "it is better to have a half million men working in the industry at good
wages..than it is to have a million working in the industry in poverty."9 1 In addition to
indirectly inducing mechanization through imposition of high wages, unions were, in
the conception of many progressive unionists, to actively promote productivity on the
shop floor. Unionist concern for productivity stemmed, in part, from a recognition
that high wages could be sustained only under conditions of high productivity.9 2 This
union actions. Second, significant numbers of capitalists would potentially benefit
from unionist stabilization policies.
90Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 408-9.
9 1Quoted in Bernstein, The Lean Years, pp. 125. Of course, as Lewis's critics noted, the
high wage policy was suicidal in the absence of a complementary policy of aggressive
organizing. See John Brophy, "Elements of a Progressive Union Policy," and Corwin D.
Edwards, "The Dilemmaof the Coal Union," in Hardman, American Labor Dynamics pp.
186-91 and pp. 179-85 respectively.
92Both progressive unionists and the AFL officialdom came to accept this proposition.
Prior to 1920 the AFL had maintained that unions ought only be concerned with
distributional aspects of wage determination. The AFL's formal recognition of the
importance of productivity came at the 1925 Convention. See McKelvey, AFL Attitudes.
pp. 1-11, 91-8; and, Wolman, "Economic Conditions," and Arthur W. Calhoun, "Labor's
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was true not only in the macro sense, but in a more immediate micro sense as well. If a
firm in a competitive industry incurred comparatively high labor costs as a result of
unionization, it could survive only if labor productivity was correspondingly high.
Thus, in the context of incomplete unionization, the promotion of productivity was a
necessary complement to the unionist strategy of product market stabilization.
Furthermore, to the extent that the open shop campaign was legitimated by appeals to
efficiency, unionist promotion of productivity was a defense against capitalist
hegemony. Unionists argued that organized labor was not only compatible with, but in
fact necessary for the maximization of efficiency. 9 3
In productivity promotion, as in market stabilization, the union was to perform
a rationalizing role that management was unable to perform unilaterally. In the
business hegemonic system, intrafirm productivity was to be secured through
tayinrization of the work prncess. This meant that management, unencumbered by
union resistance and uninformed by worker input, would impose what its engineers
deemed the optimal production process. Unionists and their allies in the progressive
wing of the Taylor Society argued that the result of such a dictatorial process was bound
to be suboptimal. They maintained that workers possessed information crucial to any
efficiency effort and that such information could not be obtained through coercion.
New Economic Policy," in Hardman, American Labor Dynamics. pp. 37-42 and pp. 320-8
respectively. In 1928 the AFL Executive Council noted: "With the principle formulated
by the Federation some years ago--standards of living can be permanently raised only
by increasing production--organized labor has a basis of common interests with
management and therefore finds cooperation an advantage." (See "Report of A. F. of L.
Executive Council," in Reoort of Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor. 1928, pp. 23.) See also: "Report of A. F. of L.
Executive Council," in Report of Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor. 1925, pp. 38-9; "Report of the Committee on
Resolutions," in ibid., pp. 231-3; and, "Report of A. F. of L. Executive Council," in Report
of Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention of the American Federation of
Labor. 1926, pp. 45-7.
9 3Progressives and AFL old-liners agreed on this point as well. For its expression by
the AFL, see McKelvey, AFL Attitudes. pp. 86.
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Advocates of business hegemony admitted so much; indeed, that was in large measure
the rationale for welfare capitalism. Unionists and progressives in the scientific
management community, however, went further. Extending the logic upon which the
state's wartime labor policy had been based, they argued that workers would not
cooperate with efficiency campaigns unless they possessed certain guarantees,
guarantees that only independent unions could provide.9 4 Worker cooperation would
be withheld so long as workers believed that the benefits of increased productivity
would accrue to management alone. Company unions, perceived by workers as
ineffectual if not collaborationist, could not assuage such fears.9 5 Unionists and their
allies argued that in order to obtain workers' consent and thereby realize the full
potential for technical efficiency, firms had to bargain with unions considered
legitimate by workers.96 Thus, in his valedictory address to the Taylor Society, Morris
Cooke declared that he thought of "a virile labor union movement as a social
necessity."97
Productivity promotion through union-management cooperation won few
converts within business; most firms remained committed to complete managerial
autonomy within the factory. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, led by the
progressive unionist Sidney Hillman, engaged in one of the few notable examples of
94See for example "Report of the AFL Executive Council," 1925: 34-5.
95See the comments of Otto Beyer, architect of union-management cooperation on the
B&O railroad cited in Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 423.
9 6Though it is easy to understand how bona fide unions might secure for workers a
share of productivity returns that might otherwise have gone to profits, it is less clear
how they might prevent technological unemployment. If demand is rising faster than
productivity, there is no problem. If, however, productivity is rising faster than
demand, workers must necessarily be displaced. Some sort of extra-firm remedy must
be provided in order to relieve such externalities. Of course, as indicated by the Lewis
quote above, not all unionists considered technological unemployment to be a problem.97 McKelvey, AFL Attitudes pp. 76. See also Sanford M. Jacoby, "Union-Management
Cooperation in the United States: Lessons from the 1920s," in Industrial and Labor
Relations Review Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1983).
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union-management cooperation. 9 8 As market stability, industrial relations and
productive efficiency were closely related, so too were the union's policies of market
stabilization and productivity promotion.9 9 The ACW operated in a fiercely competitive
industry in which labor costs were particularly significant. Competition undercut
profit margins and labor standards. The consequent undercapitalization and
exploitation, in addition to perpetuating market instability, fostered productive
inefficiency. Turnover rates were high and work stoppages were rife. Small,
ephemeral "contracting shops" produced goods of unpredictable quality while larger,
more mechanized factories carried fixed costs in an unstable environment. These
circumstances eventually led the industry's large manufacturers and mass retailers to
embrace the ACW as a stabilizin g agent. 10 0 Ideally, all firms, large and small, would be
unionized and market stability, through wage standardization, established. Creation of
such an orderly environment, according to proponents, would enhance productivity by
reducing disruptive labor unrest and by allowing the negotiated introduction of
advanced techniques. Since unionization was in fact limited to large northern firms,
the promotion of productivity through union-management cooperation within those
firms was especially important. The ACW made good on Hillman's promise to "put the
firm's productive strength in shape." 10 1 The labor manager for a Rochester firm
reported that cooperation with the ACW permitted greater efficiency than did
98 Several other cases are noted in Jacoby, "Union-Management Cooperation," pp. 27.
The discussion of the ACW follows Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal."
9 9 As Jacoby points out, four of the five significant experiments in union-management
cooperation occurred in highly competitive industries in which demand was price
elastic, labor the primary cost, and profit margins slight. Jacoby, "Union-Management
Cooperation," pp. 28.
100 Some firms, such as Hart, Schaffner, and Marx voluntarily recognized the union.
Others did so under the prodding of either the National War Labor Board or large retail
customers such as Filene's. (In fact, Hart, Schaffner, and Marx had originally
recognized the United Garment Workers. The ACW was founded when that union split
in 1914.)
10 1Sidney Hillman, "Labor Attitudes," in Hardman, American Labor Dynamics. pp. 294.
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"discipline which is purely mechanical and superimposed by officials vested with
superior authority." 10 2
On one level union-management cooperation was a defensive reaction of
organized labor to a difficult situation. 103 It was offered to capitalists as a quid pro quo
for union recognition and to unionists as the route to revitalization of the labor
movement. 104 But, for progressive unionists and their allies, union-management
cooperation was something more than simply a defense; it was the harbinger of
expanded participation by organized labor in industrial governance. Thus, Arthur
Calhoun believed that cooperation would extend the scope of industrial conflict until "it
inevitably proceeds to canvass and master the entire industrial process" 105 and Morris
Cooke believed that union assumption of industrial responsibilities would "provide the
best possible training for the larger responsibilities which would come to labor under
any re-vamping of the present order." 10 6
Union-management cooperation was part of the broader system of economic
regulation envisioned by progressive unionists. By definition the policy of
cooperation meant a commitment by the union to increasing productivity. In practice
102Quoted in Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal," pp. 217.103Many analysts, contemporary as well as current, have depicted union-management
cooperation in this way. At the time some leftists described the policy as one of "class
collaboration". Bernstein describes the AFL's endorsement of union-management
cooperation and rapprochement with scientific management as "signs of growing
conservatism". (Bernstein, The Lean Years. pp. 103.) Jacoby writes recently that
union-management cooperation was undertaken "under dire economic circumstances"
when "a continuation of normal bargaining postures could have proved fatal to either
or both parties." (Jacoby, "Union-Management Cooperation," pp. 27.)104See Sidney Hillman, "Labor Attitudes," in Hardman. American Labor Dynamics. pp.
294.
105Calhoun, "Labor's New Economic Policy," pp. 327. Calhoun was an economics
instructor at Brookwood Labor College.
1060uoted in Steve Fraser, "From the 'New Unionism' to the New Deal," Labor Histor
Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1984): 410. In contrast to Calhoun, Cooke sought to limit rather
than extend industrial conflict. This was in keeping with the tenets of progressive
scientific management as well as the New Era.
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this meant the acceptance of mechanization and the disavowal of restrictive work
rules. 107 Moreover, especially as developed during the war, it entailed the
establishment of bureaucratized grievance procedures. Such policies, however,
undermined traditional sources of craft control. 108 Thus, the unwavering commitment
of the ACW leadership to increasing productivity must be seen as part and parcel of the
progressive commitment to industrial unionism.
Progressive unionists argued that organized labor had no hope of resurrection
so long as it retained its craft basis in an industrial economy. Industrialization, they
warned, would continue with or without the cooperation of unions. As Leo Wolman
observed, "The underlying economic forces, to which American organized labor has
seemed unable to adjust itself, pursue their course and show no signs of changing their
direction." 109 Mass production and the ever more detailed division of labor begat a mass
of unskilled workers Craft unions, they argued, were irrelevant to the daily
experience of these workers.
What are the unions doing within their own house to withstand the attacks of
the company-made councils? Do they realize how much the employer is
stressing factory solidarity as against craft solidarity? Do they realize that this
argument sounds persuasive to unskilled workers, with no trade or craft. who
work in the increasingly mechanized industry? The manager who is
introducing a representation plan...talks to the workers in terms of the plant.
The trade-union organizer talks to them in terms of craft, using the hoary
symbols of a generation ago....Which is likely to catch the workers' ear?1 10
If organized labor was to penetrate the core manufacturing industries, progressives
maintained, it would have to do so on the basis of industrial unions.1 11
107Wolman, "Economic Conditions and Union Policy," pp. 40-2.
108 Again. see Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal."
109 Wolman, "Economic Conditions and Union Policy," pp. 37.
110Robert W. Dunn, "The Industrial Welfare Offensive," in Hardman, American Labor
Dynamics. pp. 223.
11 Regardless of its relevance, mass production workers were unlikely to hear even a
craft-based organizing appeal. The various craft unions asserted but did not exercise
their claims to mass production workers. (The language here is Morris's. See Morris,
Conflict within the AFL. pp. 109.) AFL organizing during in the 1920s consisted of
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Industrial unionism was facilitated by state involvement in wartime labor
relations. Within the already industrial ACW, federal pursuit of shop floor stability
legitimated the leadership's efforts to squelch artisanal resistance. In other industries,
at the local level at least, federally mandated shop committees undermined craft
distinctions. 1 12
In open-shop metal-fabricating enterprises, especially, the NWLB's shop
committees provided a vehicle for enlarging the scope of craft unions beyond
the exclusive boundaries of their nineteenth-century constitutions. The
pattern illustrated by Bridgeport's city-wide elections for worker
representatives under NWLB auspices was often repeated: Prominent trade
unionists were elected to the dominant positions in the committees. Moreover,
metal-trade activists often succeeded in making local metal-trades councils into
effective agencies for coordinating the various craft unions. Under those
circumstances, shop committees provided avehicle through which craft unions
were linked to the nonunion majority of employees, every worker had access to
some representation in dealing with the company, and the more progressively
minded and experienced trade unionists among the skilled men had organized
channels of communication with the women and unskilled men of their
factories. 113
Federal administration of the railroads hd a similar effect. Railroad workers were
distributed among sixteen craft unions, the most powerful of which--the operating
brotherhoods--were outside the AFL. 114 Though the unions remained distinct, federal
operation of the rail system "taught the value of coordinated bargaining to the union
leaders" and "magnified the tendency of workers to act together" irrespective of craft
trying to sell itself to management on the basis of union-management cooperation
through craft unions. These efforts, limited to the textile and auto industries, failed
miserably. See also Bernstein, The Lean Years. pp. 85.
112NWLB labor mediation undermined localism as well. Speaking of a complaint filed
by workers at the General Electric plant in Schenectady, Montgomery writes: "[Taking
their case to the NWLB had an important consequence: It put Schenectady's delegates
in Washington directly in contact with representatives of the Lynn, Pittsfield, Erie, and
Fort Wayne workers, who also had cases pending. In this sense, the Washington
bureaucracy opened the channels of communication, which paved the way for the
attempt at a company-wide union and strike at the end of 1918." (Montgomery, The Fall
of the House of Labor. pp. 442.)
113Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 420.
114 Zieger, Republicans and Labor. pp. 118n.
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lines. 1 15 This set the stage for a 1920 rank and file revolt which momentarily
"shattered all lines of union demarcation". 116
The consequences of state intervention, however, proved largely ephemeral. In
1919 the 'progressive' leadership of the International Association of Machinists
revoked the charter of its Bridgeport local (the one referred to by Montgomery above)
for violating the union's jurisdictional rules, 117 and federal authorities and union
officials quickly suppressed the new unions which emerged during the 1920 railroad
strike. 1 18 In the end, those unions that entered the war as industrial unions--the UMW
and the ACW--remained industrial unions while those that entered as craft unions
retained their craft structure.
The labor movement evinced an ambivalence toward state intervention in the
market place. Prior to the war the AFL was largely committed to 'voluntarism', the
proposition that industrial relations were a private matter between employers and
employees in which the state had no right to interfere. Given the frequency with
which the state, through either the courts or the militia intervened on behalf of
management, the stance was plausibly rational. State neutrality would benefit unions.
I 15 Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 400.
1 16ibid.. pp. 402.
I17 ibid., pp. 450-1. Nonetheless, the same IAM leadership pressed for amalgamation of
all metal-trades unions. Morris explains the paradox by distinguishing the
amalgamation of craft unions from the creation of an industrial union. Whereas an
industrial union would admit all workers regardless of skill, an amalgamated craft
union, even as it ignored craft distinctions, would retain a skill-based exclusivity. (See
Morris, Conflict within the AFL pp. 48-9). The machinists' proclivity toward
amalgamation was reinforced by the B&O Plan, a celebrated program of union-
management cooperation in which the they participated after 1922. According to the
plan, joint craft committees would work to improve productivity in each of the
railroad's shops while higher officers of the various unions would consult with
management on issues that transcended individual shops. (See Montgomery, The Fall of
the House of Labor. pp. 423). Some optimistic progressives observed that by organizing
workers irrespective of craft or skill, company unionism fostered industrial unionism.
(See Joseph E. Kucher. "If American Labor is to be Organized," in Hardman, American
Labor Dynamics. pp. 308-9.)
I18Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 402.
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During the war, however, the state's attitude shifted: it turned toward organized labor
as an agent of shop floor stability. Perceiving an opportunity to secure otherwise
elusive goals, the AFL suspended its voluntarist principles and entered the state's
wartime administration. 1 19 As noted several times above, the policy paid off
handsomely. -
It seemed, indeed, as though the gods had suddenly showered organized labor
with gifts. Recognition, maintenance of union standards, the right to a living
wage--all the boons for which trade unions had long been striving were now
hastily granted amid the exigencies of wartime production. 120
Soon after the war, however, the AFL reverted to its voluntarist position. Frank
Morrison, the AFL's secretary-treasurer, declared that workers would not "surrender to
any agency the functions which by right belong to trade unions, and which can be,
and have been, successfully solved by themselves through the trade unions." 12 1
Though not without reservation, progressive unionists were more positively
disposed toward state intervention. The most obvious expression of their statist
inclination was the postwar demand for nationalization of coal mines and railroads.
After the question of nationalization became moot, however, progressive unionists in
the coal and rail industries displayed a more qualified attitude toward direct state
involvement in industrial relations. The 1922 shop-craft strike, for example, "was as
much a protest against the Railroad Labor Board as it was against the railroads
119Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker. 1865-1920 (Arlington
Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1975): 109-34; Montgomery, The Fall of the House of
Labor. pp. 373; McKelvey, AFL Attitudes pp. 27-42.
120 McKelvey, AFL Attitudes. pp. 34.
12 1Quoted in Tomlins, The State and the Unions pp. 3. This reversal warrants further
examination. Why, after having fared so well during the war, did the AFL not seek
continued federal involvement in labor relations? Montgomery argues that the AFL
welcomed protection against dismissal and the maintenance of union scales but had no
use for shop committees because of their tendency to disrupt craft organization. This
might be true, but (as demonstrated by federal policy in the garment industry) shop
committees were surely not the only form state intervention could assume. (See
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 418-9.)
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themselves." 12 2 According to Zieger, workers feared the advisory board as a prelude to
compulsory arbitration. The rationale for their resistance, however, is not obvious. As
Zieger himself notes, the RLB, established under the Esch-Cummins Act of 1920, ruled in
labor's favor more often than not. Labor's grievance was against the uneven
implementation of the RLB's rulings: decisions that went against workers were
implemented while those that went against management were ignored. This being the
case, one must ask why the unions, instead of seeking abolition of the RLB, didn't push
for uniform enforcement of its rulings. 123 In any case, the unionist alternative to
Esch-Cummins was embodied in the Howell-Barkley bill. The bill, which was never
enacted, called for the replacement of the RLB by a mediation board that lacked
decision making power, the designation of the the sixteen standard (as opposed to
company) unions as workers' sole collective bargaining agents, and the establishment
of national adjustment boards. 124 The proposed dismantlement of the RLB
notwithstanding, the bill clearly envisioned substantial federal involvement in labor
relations.
The miners' union, though wary of compulsory arbitration, also looked toward
the federal government. In 1922 the UMW refused to submit to binding arbitration as
proposed by the Harding administration. 12 5 Two years later, however, UMW President
John Lewis sought Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover's assistance in securing a
renewed CCF agreement. 126 Hoover, for his own reasons, readily complied with Lewis's
12 2Zieger, Republicans and Labor. pp. 118.
12 3Similarly, one must ask why Warren Harding, who considered the RLB's decisions to
be legally binding, declined to enforce them against the railroads. See Zieger,
Republicans and Labor pp. 118-9, 192.
124ibid., pp. 197.
12 5ibid., pp. 125.
12 6Lewis is difficult to classify. One the one hand, he stood against Samuel Gompers as
the progressive candidate for the AFL presidency at the 1920 convention. On the other
hand, he fought against nationalization and its progressive advocates within the UMW.
See Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. pp. 3%-409.
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request. 127 The resulting agreement, known as the Jacksonville Agreement,
maintained union wage rates throughout the CCF. But in doing so, it exacerbated the
pressure of nonunion competition on the CCF and, by extension, on the UMW. As the
Jacksonville Agreement disintegrated, Lewis called upon the administration to secure
the agreement it had brokered. The administration refused and by 1928 the CCF as a
stabilized bargaining area had ceased to exist.128 As a consequence, Levis abandoned
his previous opposition to legislation and supported a bill introduced by Senator James
Watson that would have cartelized the coal industry and guaranteed the right to
collective bargaining. Ultimately the bill came to naught. Nonetheless, the backing
given Watson's bill, the attempt to obtain government enforcement of the Jacksonville
Agreement, and the earlier calls for nationalization demonstrate the miner's
receptivity to state intervention in the economy.
Unwavering support for state economic intervention rame from Sidney
Hillman, leader of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and one of the most coherent
advocates of a unionist system of economic regulation. 129 Given the effective use that
the ACW had made of wartime government regulation in pursuit of its own objectives.
Hillman welcomed state intervention in the labor market. 13 0 Moreover, in Hillman's
vision, the appropriate purview of the state extended well beyond the labor market: the
state was to assume primary responsibility for 'macroeconomic' management. Such
management entailed national planning and countercyclical spending. Testifying
before the Senate in 1932, Hillman argued:
No one industry can stabilize itself entirely by its own efforts. Regularity in
production and employment depends on the general state of industry and
127 Zieger, Republicans and Labor. pp. 227-39.
128 ibid., pp. 254-8.
129 The account here, like the previous discussion of the ACW, follows Fraser.
13 0Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal," pp. 220.
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agriculture, in short, on the economic health of the country as a whole and that
means national planning. 13 1
Though he accepted selective, state-sponsored cartelization as a necessary adjunct to
planning, Hillman emphasized policies that would bolster aggregate demand. 13 2 For
example, in contrast to the AFL's voluntarist position, he supported government
provision of unemployment benefits. According to Hillman, a high standard of living
was "no more a question of mere justice"; rather, it was "essential to our system of mass
production to create a consumers' demand for almost unlimited output."13 3
Maintenance of aggregate demand, however, was not to be the exclusive responsibility
of the state.
In the unionist system of economic regulation, organized labor was assigned the
critical function of enforcing high wages. It was this function, moreover, that lent
coherence to the system's various elements. Though high wages were acknowledged
within business and labor circles alike as the key to consumer demand, unionists
believed that neither employer enlightenment nor company unionism was adequate
guarantee of high wages. Therefore, unionists maintained that a labor movement
sufficiently robust to enforce high wages was necessary not only for product market
stabilization but for 'macroeconomic' stabilization as well. High wages were in turn
linked to the unionist policy of productivity promotion. High wages could persist only
so long as productivity within both individual firms and the general economy
remained high. Conversely, it was argued, sustained increases in productivity
depended upon corresponding growth in consumer demand. On these points, and the
notion that bona fide unions were essential for full realization of the economy's
131Quoted in Fraser, "From the 'New Unionism' to the New Deal," pp. 414.
132 ibid., pp. 414-25. The preference for demand stimulation over cartelization
complimented the restrictive role allotted trade associations in the unionist system of
economic regulation.
133 ibid., pp. 409.
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productive potential, traditional and progressive unionists were agreed. 134 Progressive
unionists, however, went one step further. In the context of a mass production
economy predicated upon mass consumption, sufficient purchasing power could be
assured only if the machine-operating minions were organized. 135 Given the
presumption that craft unions were by inclination and appeal unable to organize the
unorganized, progressives concluded that if organized labor was to construct a viable
system of economic regulation, then that system would have to be founded on the basis
of industrial unionism. Thus, it was the enforcement of high wages throughout the
economy that linked the micro to the macro in the progressives' vision of economic
regulation and gave their system its conceptual unity.
Conclusion
Two models of economic regulation, one centered on business hegemony and
another revolving around negressive unionism, vied for supremacy in the 1920s. As
diametric as they were, each model drew on ideological and institutional elements of
the wartime political economy. The business hegemonic system, emphasizing
particularly construed notions of self-regulation, rested upon trade associations,
welfare capitalism and a facilitating yet circumscribed state. Trade associations were to
stabilize product markets in industries lacking oligopolistic concentration. Managerial
autonomy within the factory was to be reestablished through an open shop campaign
led by those same trade associations and a complimentary program of company
unionism and welfare capitalism. 'Macroeconomic' stability was to be assured by the
product market stability achieved through trade associations, the high wages
distributed by welfare capitalism, and moderate countercyclical spending coordinated
by the federal government. The progressive unionist system, stressing broader notions
134See footnote 92 above.
135Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal," pp. 221, 241; idem., "From the 'New Unionism' to the New
Deal," pp. 409-10.
41
of participation, rested upon organized labor and a relatively autonomous state. Unions
were to counteract destructive product market competition by equalizing wages across
all firms. Workers were to be integrated into a cooperative production process through
industrial unions. In conjunction with state planning, union-enforced wages were to
assure sufficient consumer demand for 'macroeconomic' stability. Of the contending
programs for economic regulation, the progressive unionist system remained little
more than a dissident vision while, to the extent that either model was coherently
implemented, the business hegemonic system dominated the American political
economy in the 1920s.
Ultimately the business hegemonic system fell victim to the Great Depression.
The limited countercyclical spending envisaged by Herbert Hoover proved woefully
inadequate for the task at hand. 136 In the private sphere, plant maintenance was no
substitute for investment in operating stocks and equipment. In the public sphere,
state and local governments could not and the federal government would not spend
sufficient amounts to counteract the fall in autonomous private spending. In the
context of the persistent recession, even the largest of employers in oligopolistic
industries could not maintain wage rates. 137 The consequent wage cuts had a twofold
effect: on the one hand, they aggravated the general weakness of aggregate demand
by reducing consumer purchasing power; on the other hand, they undermined
industrial peace by reducing the legitimacy of welfare capitalism. Competitive
industries were similarly incapable of coping with the prolonged recession. Voluntary
trade associations, potentially unstable even in the best of times, were ineffectual in
the face of pervasive downward pressure on price levels. The Depression simply
overwhelmed the business hegemonic system of economic regulation.
13 6Barber, New Era to New Deal pp. 107-8.
137 Brody, "Welfare Capitalism," pp. 72-3.
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Despite their seemingly ephemeral character, the business hegemonic system
and its progressive unionist rival warrant continued attention for historical as well as
contemporary reasons.
The system of economic regulation that emerged during the 1930s was not
created anew; it evolved out of the debates and institutions of the 1920s. The NRA was in
large measure an extension of trade associationalism, albeit with a compulsory rather
than voluntary nature. Later policy, especially as embodied in the text and
implementation of the Wagner Act, increasingly approximated the system envisioned
by progressive unionists. Furthermore, this continuity of policy was paralleled by a
continuity of debate. As people struggled to create a system which would overcome the
Depression (the "moral equivalent of war" in Franklin Roosevelt's words) they made
frequent reference to the institutions employed during the First World War. Thus, the
discussion of the 1930s recapitulated that of the immediate postwar period. Morpe,'.er.
the debate of the 1930s addressed the intervening experience, something which was in
itself a product of the earlier debate. Therefore, in order to understand the evolution of
the New Deal one must examine the 1920s.
The Keynesian settlement that grew out of the New Deal and World War II bore a
striking resemblance to the unionist system of economic regulation. Industrial unions
organized workers of all skill in the economy's manufacturing core; wage agreements,
as enshrined in the paradigmatic 1948 General Motors contract, were tied to
productivity rates; and, the state assumed responsibility for maintaining levels of
aggregate demand. But by the 1980s that system was in disarray. Unions were in sharp
decline and state economic intervention was in disrepute.
Indeed, the 1980s look in many ways like the 1920s: a sharp recession followed
by rapid growth and then a stock market crash. Although superficially similar events
60 years apart have very different meanings, the comparison is illuminating. As in the
1920s, Americans are consciously searching for a new system of economic regulation
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that will foster growth and productivity. The administrative and fiscal changes
implemented by the Republican administration and the industrial policy debate within
the Democratic Party are expressions of that search. Like that of the 1920s, the
emergent system seems to be dominated by business. Concessionary contracts written
at the local level are common, overall unionization rates are the lowest they have been
since the Depression, and unions are excluded from the economy's leading sectors. It
may be that a business-led strategy emphasizing workplace flexibility and managerial
autonomy, if complimented by adequate macroeconomic policy, will prove lasting.
After all, were it not for the Depression, the business hegemonic system of the 1920s
may well have endured.
If organized labor is to avoid such an outcome, it must develop a coherent
alternative. Much as the craft-oriented AFL of the 1920s had to adapt to mass
production, the present day AFL-CIO must adapt to the high tech and service economies.
Similarly, unions must develop innovative strategies sensitive to the requirements of
competitive efficiency if they are to counter management techniques imported from
Japan and reminiscent of company unionism. If the US is to successfully compete in a
world economy predicated on free trade and rapid technological adjustment, then labor
must be adaptable to changing circumstance. The problem for workers is how to be
flexible without being pliant. The solution could lie in the labor movement. Now as
always workers seek protection against the hardship of economic readjustment.
Individual firms are generally unable to provide adequate assurances. If organized
labor were to provide such protection, through either its own offices or those of the
state, then it could secure for itself an permanent role in a reconstituted and revitalized
American economy. If, however, organized labor ossifies, then it will either break or
be broken. The words of Leo Wolman, written in 1928, again hold true in 1988:
Where it has long held power and wishes to retain it, organized labor has begun
to learn that it must accept an increasing measure of industrial responsibility;
that it must adjust its economic policies to the needs of a changing industry; and
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that it must discard many restrictive practices that have proved in the long run
more harmful than beneficial to its members. The perception of these elements
of sound policy earlier in the history of the movement would have salvaged
much that has in its course been almost irretrievably lost. 138
The history of the 1920s is instructive: it suggests the dangers inherent in failure to
adapt as well as the lines along which an alternative vision might be built.
138 Wolman, "Economic Conditions," pp. 42.
